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Individual and Group Risk-Taking in a 
Two-Choice Situation1 
ROBERT B. ZAJONC, ROBERT .J. WOIAXI~;, MPRNA A. WOLOSIN, 
ARTD STEVEN J. SHERMAN:! 
The Universil~l of Micltigcrtl 
Individual and group decision making under uncertainty was 
explored in an attempt to determine whether individual risk 
preferences change under group conditions. Subjects predicted 
which of two differentially probable stimulus events would occur, 
and were paid for correct anticipations in a series of 360 trials. 
The expected value of the choices was held constant hy varying 
payoff inversely with the frequency of thr two events. After 180 
trials, individuals either continued alone or were formed into 
three-man groups. Croups showed consistent and significant shifts 
in the conservative direction, while individuals remaining alone 
did not shift. The data were examined in the light of various 
group-decision models and in the light of other explanations of 
t,he risky-shift phenomenon. Changes in individual risk preferences 
were interpreted as deriving from a change in subjective utilities 
of orrtcomes which occurs in the group situation. 
Recent work in experimental social psychology has identificcl a phe- 
nomenon known as the “risky shift,” which occurs when individuals, first 
independently and then as groups, make choices between uncertain alter- 
natives. The general and compelling finding has been that the level of 
risk-taking is enhanced by the group situation. An extensive review by 
Kogan and Wallach (1967a) summarizes the research on risky shift and 
examines a number of explanations offered by various workers to account 
for the findings in this area. It has been proposed, for instance, that. a 
risky orientation is socially more desirable than caution. This hypothesis 
assumes that risk preferences of individuals taken one at a t,ime are lower 
than the risk that their culture expects of them. The group situation 
makes the cultural value of risk salient by requiring public commitment 
from the individual, who therefore adjusts his risk level upward. This 
hypot,hesis has been challenged by Bern, Wallach, and Kogan (1965) who 
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found no risky shift when individuals anticipated that their personal 
decisions would be disclosed to other group members. 
In a similar vein, Brown (1965, p. 701) suggested that just because 
group discussion about matters of uncertain outcomes makes the value of 
risk salient, and because it displays the distribution of individual risk 
preferences, once in a group, the more cautious members discover that 
their risk levels are substandard. Having this new information, they 
conform to what. they now think is the norm. But when individuals are 
provided with information about the decisions of others in the group, 
either no shifts or minimal shifts are found (Kogan and Wallnch, 1967c; 
Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Wallach and Kogan, 1965). The third explanation 
assumes that the group situation allows the individual to gather more 
information about the alternatives, and hence leads to more rational 
courses of action. This explanation, therefore, also assumes that risky 
decisions are more rational t.han conservative decisions-an assumption 
which Kogan and Wallach (1967a) reject. Moreover, experimental results 
show that explicit information about the consequences of the alternative 
courses of action is not, by itself, a sufficient condition for a risky shift 
(Bern, Wallach, and Kogan, 1965; Wallach, Kogan, and Bern, 1964). 
Kogan and Wallach (1967a) also reject the “sympathy” explanation 
which holds that if one “knows that others who agree with his views will 
be present when the consequences of his decisions are experienced, he may 
be willing to accept a greater risk of failure than would otherwise be the 
case” (Kogan and Wallach, 1967a, p. 254). First, they have shown that 
presence of ot.hers alone could not produce a risky shift (Wallach and 
Kogen, 1965). And secondly, they found that when individuals expected to 
suffer the aversive consequences of their decisions with others of like fate, 
conservative rather than risky shift was obtained (Bern et nl., 1965). The 
fifth explanation of risky shift postulates that initial risk level of indi- 
viduals is correlat,ed wit’h leadership and influence, and that those who 
are initially riskier arc also more influential. And indeed, Clausen (1965)) 
Flanders and Thistlethwaite (1967)) Wallach, Kogan, and Bcm (1962), 
and Wallach, Kogan, and Burt (1965) have found positive correlations 
between initial risk level and perceived influence. But Kogan and Wal- 
lath argue that these correlations may reflect a consequence of risky 
shift, rather than its cause. Regardless of the reasons why a group changes 
toward a riskier course of action, the risky individual will necessarily be 
perceived as more influential. The leadership hypothesis is further con- 
tradicted by the results of Kogan and Wallach (1967b) who found a 
negative (although nonsignificant) correlation between initial risk and 
perceived influence in groups that manifested minimal risky shifts. 
The explanation favored by Kogan and Wallach (1967a) invokes the 
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concept of diffusion of res,ponsibility. This theory argues that “in a context 
of group discussion [an individual] feels less personal responsibility for 
failure in the pursuit of risky options than he would feel if deciding alone” 
(Kogan and Wnllach, 1967a, p. 260). A series of studies (Bern et nl., 1965; 
Wallach et al., 1964) in which responsibility for decision making was 
indirectly manipulated gives some support to the theory, but risky shift 
was obtained in an experiment by Marquis (1962)) in which an individual 
group member was designated as solely responsible for the consequences 
of group decision. The diffusion-of-responsibility hypothesis is further 
contradicted by Atkinson’s (1957) theory of risk-taking behavior, which 
predicts risk-taking as a function of the interaction among motivation, 
probability of success, and incentive. Atkinson proposed that alternatives 
involving moderate risk become attractive to those who are motivated 
by a desire for success, while ext,remely risky or extremely conservative 
alternatives are attractive to those motivated by a fear of failure. Ex- 
tensive empirical work supports Atkinson’s theory (see, for instance, 
Atkinson and Feather, 1966). Thus, if the group reduces “personal rc- 
sponsibility for failure,” it should also reduce the fear of failure, and 
hence prompt the risky individual to moderate his risk-behavior. Accord- 
ing to Atkinson’s theory, only for extremely conservative groups would 
a risky shift be predicted. 
It appears from the above that the risky-shift phenomenon is generally 
regarded as a change in individual risk preferences which occurs in group 
interaction. In a recent paper, Kogan and Wallach (1967c) state it as a 
matter of ‘<clearly established . . . fact that group interaction enhances 
individual risk-taking dispositions” (p. 75). The major evidence for this 
generalization comes from a study by Wallach and Kogan (1965) in which 
groups discussed hypothetical choices without a requirement for con- 
sensus, and in which a significant risky shift was found. More indirect 
evidence comes from studies in which group members are first tested 
individually for their risk preferences, are then allowed to interact and 
reach consensus, and are finally retested for their individual risk prefer- 
ences after consensus has been reached. These studies, too, show that 
following consensus, the individual’s risk preferences agree more with the 
group consensus than with his own pre-discussion level (Kogan and Wal- 
lath, 1967b). This evidence, however, is insufficient, for concluding that 
group consensus is riskier than the average of individual risk preferences 
because individual risk preferences have changed in the course of group 
interaction. Such a change may have been the result of group consensus 
rather than its cause. For, if a risky group consensus is reached, it, can- 
independently of its causes-influence the individual mrmbcr’s future risk 
preferences. 
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Given the above evidence, the question still may be raised as to whether 
a change in individual risk preference is a necessary condition of the high 
levels of risk that characterize group consensus. It can readily be shown 
that group consensus may be riskier than the average of the individual 
risk preferences without the individuals’ risk preferences changing at all. 
Consider, for instance, that there are just two alternatives, A and B, 
having equal expected values, between which individuals must choose. 
One of t,hese alternatives, A, is the riskier one; that is, it has a lower 
likelihood of occurrence than B, but a higher payoff. When making these 
decisions adone, individuals choose A over B, with a fixed probability, p, 
the same for all individuals. These individuals are formed into three- 
person groups with the requirement that they reach consensus in choosing 
between A and B. If the probability, p, of choosing the riskier alternative, 
-4, is the same for all group members, t,hen the probability of the group 
consensus (reached by a majority vote) being also risky, is II co y p’(1 - p)n-i, 
where n is the size of the group and m is equal to n/2 + .5 for odd group 
sizes, and to 11/2 + 1 for even group sizes. If they proceed by majority 
rule, and if p is equal to .7, let us say, the probability that as a group they 
will choose A, the riskier of the two alternatives, will be .784. Thus, with- 
out any changes in individual risk preferences, the group consensus 
attained by means of a majority decision would have a higher probability 
of being risky than the average of the individual risk preferences. It is 
clear from the formula for group decision that if p is greater than .5, 
group decision will always exceed p, except when p is equal to unity or 
zero. It is also true, however, that for p < .5, the group consensus would 
be more conservative than the average of the individual risk preferences. 
The same general result will obtain when the individual probabilities are 
not the same. For three group members, i, i, k, whose probabilities of 
choosing A are unequal, the probability that the majority will choose A is 
Pip@!: + PiPj (1 - Pk) + Pi (1 - pj)Pl, + (1 - pi)PjPk. 
If the group operates under different decision schemes, different out- 
comes would be expected. If, for instance, the group decides on a risky 
course of action only when all individuals have unanimously chosen it, 
it will always be more conservative than the average of prior individual 
risk preferences, except for p = 0 and p = 1. For the above example with 
p = .7, the probability of three individuals reaching a unanimous decision 
in favor of A would be .343. Smoke and Zajonc (1962) have compared 
various decision schemes, such as majority, quorum, dictatorship, una- 
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nimity, oligarchy, etc., for their departure from the average of individual 
judgments. AI1 of these schemes assume that individual preferences re- 
main constant whether the individual makes decisions alone or as a group 
member. And all decision schemes except one generate a group solution 
that substantially differs from the average of individual choices, without 
these individual preferences changing at all. The exception is the dictator- 
ship by an individual whose risk preference is cc@ to that of the average 
of the remaining group members. 
Certain implications follow from considering the above group-decision 
schemes. If the groups used by Wallach and his co-workers were com- 
posed of primarily risky individuals and if they operated under a 
majority rule, a risky shift would indeed be predicted for them-but not 
necessarily as a function of changes in individual risk preferences. It is 
impossible, however, to determine whether individual risk prtfcrcnces of 
subjects used in research on risky shift are indeed on the risky side of .5. 
Most of the work on this problem has used the so-called ‘Lcl~oice-dilemn~a” 
task, consisting of 12 hypothetical life situations. In each of the 12 items 
the protagonist faces a choice between an unlikely but nttrnctivc outcome, 
and one that is less attractive but more likely. The subject chooses the 
minimum probability of the risky alternative that he would recommend 
to the protagonist as acceptable. His possible scores on each item are 1,3, 
5, 7, 9, and 10. If the individuals were choosing among these scores at 
random we would obtain a mean of 5.83 on each item, and a total of 69.96 
on 12 items. A normal distribution of scores would generate an even 
higher mean and total. It is of interest that almost always individual risk 
preferences are on the risky side of these figures (Bern et al., 1965; Kogan 
and Wallach: 19673; 196713; Wallach et al., 1965; etc.). 
And the riskier are these prior individual risk preferences, the great,er 
is the shift. This general observation holds when one compares various 
conditions within experiments, or when one compares items within a given 
condition (e.g., Siegel and Zajonc, 1967; Teger and Pruitt, 1967). It is 
clear from t,he formula for majority decision tha,t a positive correlation 
between initial risk and group consensus would indeed be expected. Teger 
and Pruitt, (1967) interpret Brown’s (1965) ‘%aluc theory” as also pre- 
dicting a positive correlation between initial risk and the amount of risky 
shift. They argue that if there is a risky shift on a given item becnllse 
the consideration of that item elicits the value of risk, then the considera- 
tion of that item by the isolated individual should also prompt him 
toward the riskier alternatives. And, of course, if the consideration of 
another item elicits the value of caution, the individual’s prcdiscussion 
choice should tend toward conservative altcrnntives. Teger and Pruitt 
(1967) also note that such correlations are :It best irrelevant to the theory 
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that postulates diffusion of responsibility. While this lsst observation 
is correct, the argument that positive correlations between initial risk 
and risky shift support Brown’s “va,lue theory” is not entirely conviucing. 
If the individual tends t,oward risky (or conservative) alternatives 
because the item elicits the value of risk (or caution), it is also possible 
to conclude that. he will be less influenced by the group. This conclusion 
follows from the assumption that the elicitation of the value by the item 
makes the norm clear and provides a reference for the individual’s choices. 
His decision under these conditions is firm and fixed, and the group should 
have a greater influence over him on items on which he is unclear. 
In the present study a number of individuals arc given experience with 
two alternatives t,hat have uncertain outcomes of fixed probabilities and 
of equal expected values. The individuals choose between these alterna- 
tives and espcrience the consequences of their decisions directly and im- 
mediately. Moreover, these events are repeated on a large number of 
occasions. Aft,er a number of trials, subjects in one condition are formed 
into groups of three and reach joint decisions. The groups are compared 
for their risk-taking behavior with individuals who continue working 
alone for the entire experimenta session. An attempt is made to exclude 
from the decisions factors other than risk. The events about which deci- 
sions arc made are simple, and their outcomes have presumably only those 
consequences that arc specified to the subjects by the designated arbitrary 
payoffs. On each trial the subject (or the group) makes a guess about 
which of two lights will go on, and is paid each time for a correct guess. 
Since the expected values of the t,wo outcomes are equal, and the proba- 
bilities of each event are known, exact predictions for the group consensus 
can be made assuming various group-decision schemes, such as majority, 
dictatorship, unanimity, etc. If the obtained data on group consensus 
should differ from predictions for the various reasonable group-decision 
schemes, it could be concluded that a change in individual risk preferences 
occurred when the individual joined the group. 
If there is a change in an individual’s risk preference, it. can occur just 
because the individual interacts with others, or-under the conditions of 
the present. experiment-because on a series of trials, his group chose risk 
levels that were at variance with his own, and because these group deci- 
sions had consequences that he previously failed to observe. If the con- 
sequences of such group decisions are perceived by the individual as 
favorable, he would be likely to change his risk preference to be more in 
line with his group. If they are perceived as unfavorable, he will be less 
influenced. It should be not’ed that in experiments using the choice- 
dilemma method this latter possibility cannot be examined beca.use the 
consequences of one’s own and one’s group’s decisions are indeterminate. 
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This method differs in several ot.her respects from the standard one used 
in research on risky shift. In most experiments subjects are not given 
direct experience with the probabilities or with t.he payoffs of the nlterna- 
tives. In the majority of instances they deal with hypothetical situations 
which are arbitrarily labeled for them as having some designated proba- 
bility. They are told, for instance, that, the heart. operation which an 
hypothetical Mr. B is to undergo has seven out of ten chances of succeed- 
ing. But telling the subject about these probabilities may not produce 
the equivalent subjective probability. It is certainly not the same as 
having the subject play with a set of dice for a number of trials. Lonergan 
and McClintock (1961)) in what is probably the first study in this area, 
and Davis, Hoppe, and Hornseth (1966), in a more recent attempt, 
presented their subjects with rather simple and clear risk situations, and 
gave them what seemed to be sufficient experience with decisions. Yet in 
neither study was a risky shift found, although there was an indication 
in the study carried out by Davis et al. that a group-decision scheme 
such as pluralit,y may have been operating. 
Making decisions about such matters as surgery, one’s career, etc., 
involves payoffs that are more complex than the experimental instructions 
specify. The subjective value of a successful operation, or of a profitable 
career, may vary tremendously from subject to subject and from time to 
time for a given subject. There arc no ready means for him to quantify 
these values, so that he can compare them with other subjects with whom 
he must make joint decisions. Since risk is defined as a function of the 
probability of the outcome and of its payoff, risk preference can be 
evaluated only if these elements are well known. One could argue that 
in making decisions in the choice-dilemma task the subjects employ not 
only the criterion of risk (as specified by the experimenter) but other 
criteria as well. It is the purpose of this study to examine a method in 
which the proportion of factors other than risk in individual and group 
decision making is minimized. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Forty-eight subjects, all male undergraduates, were recruited from the paid 
psychology subject pool. A minimum of $1.25 per hour was guaranteed. When 
scheduled, subjects were not told about the purpose of the experiment or that they 
could earn a greater sum of money during the course of the experiment. 
Apparatus 
Two l/25-watt lights, mounted on a small panel, served to signal stimulus events. 
One was marked 1 cent and the other 1% cents. For half of the subjects the left 
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stimulus light was associated with the high payoff, and for the remainder, with the 
low payoff. A punched-tape program controlled the timing and the secruence of 
stimulus events. Subjects were equipped with switches for making their rhoices. 
Stacks of blue and white chips for keeping track of winnings were supplied. Stimulus 
events and ,subjccts’ responses were recorded on an Esterline-Angus Evc’nt Recorder. 
Design and Procedure 
All subjects were given 360 trials in 12 blocks of 30. For the first 180 trials all 
subjects worked alone in isolated 6- X &foot cubicles. In one condition (lI), 24 
subjects continued as previously for the remaining 180 trials. In another condition 
(IG), 24 subjects were brought in groups of three to a larger room where they were 
given the remaining 180 trials. 
Upon arriving, the subject was met by the experimenter and led into one of three 
6- X g-foot cubicles. After a short while, the following instructions were given over 
an intercom system : 
In front of you, you see two lights. Every seven seconds one or the other will 
go on. You also see two response plates. During each 7-second interval you are to 
press one plate or the other to anticipate which light will come on. If  you press 
the left plate and the left light comes on, you win 1 (one and a half) cent. I f  you 
press the right plate and the right light comes on, you win 1% (one) cents. If  you 
press one plate and the opposite light comes on you win nothing. Also, if you fail 
to press within the ‘I-second interval, you win nothing. 
You can keep track of your winnings by the chips which you see in front of 
you. If  you win I (one and a half) cent by anticipating the left light, place a 
white (blue) chip into your bank. If  you win 1% (one) cents by anticipating the 
right light, place a blue (white) chip into your bank. Your winnings will also be 
kept automatically. We guarantee you a minimum of $1.25 per hour and you get 
to keep whatever you win over that amount; that is, you will get $1.25 per hour 
or your winnings, whichever is more. 
The stimulus light marked “1 cent” had a probability of .6, and the stimulus light 
marked “lx/r cent” had a probability of .4. The sequence of stimulus events was 
random, except for the constraint that these probabilities be observed in each block 
of 30 trials. Stimuli were presented every 7 seconds, and there was a l-minute rest 
period after each trial-block. 
IG Condition. At the end of the sixth trial-block subjects in the IG (Individual- 
Group) condition were told that the first part of the experiment was over. The ex- 
perimenter then met all three subjects and led them to a room equipped with 
apparatus identical to that which they had used in isolation. Instructions were again 
issued over the intercom: 
Again you see the lights and the plates. Now you are working as a team. This 
time one or the other light will go on every 20 seconds. During this interval the 
three of you will work together to come to a unanimous decision as to which plate 
to press. .4fter you decide, one of you will press the plate. [Subject’s name1 will 
press for the first set of trials, [another subject’s name1 for the second, [the third 
subject’s name1 for the third, again for the fourth, etc. 
Once again, if you press the left plate and the left light comes on, each of you 
wins 1 (one and a half) cent. I f  you press the right plate and the right light comes 
on, each of you wins II/ (one) cents. If  you press one plate and the other comes 
on, or if you fail to press within the 20-second interval, each of you wins nothing. 
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Either you all win or all lose on every trial. Again, you can keep track of your 
winnings by placing the appropriate chips in your bank. 
Six blocks of 30 trials, each separated by a-minute intervals between the blocks, 
were given. As announced to the subjects, there was a 20-second intertrial interval. 
II Co&ilion. At the end of the sixth trial-block subjects in the II (Individual- 
Individual) condition were told that the first part of the experiment was over. They 
were then taken out of their cubicles by the experimenter and allowed to relax for 
about 3 or 4 minutes. They were not permitted, however, to speak to one another. 
After the rest period, they were ushered back to their cubicles and continued as 
previously for six blocks of 30 trials. 
After the experimental session, an explanation of the experiment was given, and 
the subjects were paid their wages and given their winnings. They were also asked 
not to speak to their friends or acquaintances about the experiment. 
RESULTS 
All the results are reported in percentages of risky choices. Table 1 
shows these choices for both experimental sessions and both experimental 
TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGES OF RISKY CHOICES MADE BY INDIVIXTALS AND GROUPS 





a Means having different subscripts are significantly different from each other at the 
.Ol level. Among the means that share the same subscript no pair is significantly dif- 
ferent at the .05 level. Comparisons were made by t,he Newman-Keuls method. 
conditions. Analysis of variance, in which conditions, trials, and sessions 
were the factors tested, revealed a significant interaction between condi- 
tions and sessions (F = 11.55, 1 and 154 df, p < .OOl). For the purposes 
of this analysis, in both experimental conditions groups of three subjects 
generated data points. In the IG condition, the scores during the first 
session were the average percentages of risky choices made by the group 
members individually, and in the second session, they were percentages 
of risky group decisions. In order to make the reliabilities of the scores 
in the II condition comparable to those in the IG condition, random 
groups of three subjects were composed, and the responses of these three- 
man “groups” were averaged for both sets of 180 trials. 
It is also evident from the Newman-Keuls comparisons that the two 
conditions do not differ from each other during the first 180 trials, and 
that t,he II condition shows an unchanged level of risk during the second 
180 trials. The difference that emerges as significant is that in the IG 
condition the proportion of risky choices decreases during the second 180 
trials. The final result that is clear from Table 1 is that during the first 
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180 t.rials subjects in both conditions average their responses around 50%. 
These averages reflect individual scores quite reliably. In the two con- 
ditions combined the standard deviation for the first 180 trials was only 
8.52%. During the second 180 trials the II subjects continue to choose 
risky and conservative alternatives with indifference, while the IG sub- 
jects shift toward conservatism. 
Several discussions were monitored by means of a concealed micro- 
phone. In general, very little systematic information could be gatheretl 
by observing them. Typically a member would suggest one alternative, 
and the others would either indicate consent or make a counterproposal. 
Arguments were seldom presented and the most frequent reasons given 
in suggesting a choice were that the suggested alternative had not 
occurred for a long time, or that, it was the more frequent and therefore 
the more likely one, or that the infrequent one was paying off more, OI 
that the proponent had a “feeling” of being right.. 
Figure 1 shows percentages of risky choices over the 12 trial-blocks. 
Trend analyses for the II and the IG groups separately reveal significant 
quadratic trends (P = 16.07 for the II condition and F = 12.05 for the 
IG condition, both with 1 and 77 df). The pattern of choice is thus as 
- IG (Individual -Group) 
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FIG. 1. Percentages of risky decisions in the II and IG conditions. 
stable as it is curious. Both in the II and the IG conditions subjects begin 
the series with a distinctive preference for the risky alternative, but 
already on the second trial-block there is a distinct drop in risk prefer- 
encc. A leveling-off of risk occurs on the third trial-block. In the II group 
-ubjccts continue at about 45% of risky choices for all but the last two 
tri:&blo?ks, when riskiness increases. This increase in risky choices is 
equally true for the IG condition. Subjects in this condition, however, 
reach an asymptote of 50% at, the close of the individual trials, and 
groups formed of these same subjects drop their risk level to about 42% 
on the initial trial-block. We can only speculate about the shape of these 
curves. The first change in risk level that occurs on the first two or three 
trial blocks is perhaps simply a learning effect. Subjcct,s start at a rela- 
tively high risk level, they discover that they are correct in their guesses 
only about four out of ten times, and change to a lower risk level. If no 
other events occurred, they would remain at this level. For subjects who 
are formed into groups after 180 trials the risk level drops. We shall 
return to this effect later. But in both the II and the IG conditions there 
is a rise in risk-taking on the last two trial-blocks. One could perhaps 
attribute this last rise in risk-taking to a sort of last-ditch attitude. After 
300 trials the subject knows t’hat he is approaching the end of the experi- 
ment and that he will have only a limited number of trials left. He has 
been winning approximately 18 cents per trial-block, and hence has 
accumulated only about $1.80 during an hour and a half of work. If he 
continues as previously he can add another 36 cents to his winnings--a 
sum apparently not satisfying his aspirations. He thus becomes riskier. 
Having very little to lose, he changes his strategy in favor of risky 
choices. This conjecture applies less to the II condition, in which subjects 
also accumulated approximately $1.80, but during a ~nuch shorter time. 
Hence, on tri:ll 300 they were less likely to think that the session would 
soon end. 
DISCI-SSIOS 
In contrast with most risky-shift studies, in the present experiment 
groups shifted their risk preferences toward greater caution. This con- 
servative shift was significant and fairly substantial. Out of eight groups, 
only one shifted in the direction of greater risk. Figure 2 shows data for 
each group separately, where the consistency of the conservative shifts is 
apparent. In four cases the group is more conservative than the most 
conservative of its members (Groups I, II, VI, and VIII), and in three 
cases the group is more conservative than two of its members (Groups 
III, IV, and VII). In two of these cases this difference is quite sub- 
stantial (Groups II and VII). For the group that changes in the direction 
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FIG. 2. Individual risk levels and group shifts in risk level (IG condition). 
of greater risk (Group V), the shift becomes clearly apparent only on the 
very last trial-block. 
It is also evident from Fig. 2 that, on the whole, individual curves have 
greater intertrial variability than group curves. In most cases risk prefrr- 
ences of the group are fairly stable, especially between trials 181 and 300. 
During the last 60 trials there is a tendency, sometimes rather pro- 
nounced, for risk preference to increase, and on the last trial-block three 
out of the eight groups exceed 50% of risky choices. 
It is possible that, given a greater number of trials, all groups would 
eventually prefer the risky alternative. This is a matter of empirical 
question that can be readily ascertained. If the end-of-session rise in risk, 
however, is associated with a “last-ditch” attitude, a permanent and 
stable shift toward risk would not occur. In any event, because the same 
end-of-session rise in risk is observed for individuals working alone, this 
pattern of results would not constitute solid evidence in favor of the 
diffusion-of-responsibility theory. 
While the data are in clear conflict with previous results on risky shift, 
they are equally in conflict with the group-decision models discussed in 
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the introduction. In six out of the eight groups the majority of the team 
members, as individuals, preferred risky to conservative choices (Groups 
I, II, III, IV, VI, and VIII). Yet, in all these cases, the group consensus 
was more conservative than the individual average. 
Majority-decision models also predict that the degree of risky shift is a 
positive function of the degree of individual risk preference, and there- 
fore one would expect a positive correlation between the average of 
individual risk preferences and the extent of risky shift. The results, to 
the contrary, show a correlation of --.79, significant at the .Ol level. 
Figure 3 plots shifts in risky choices against averages of individual risk 
preferences, and it is clear from these data that this relationship is rathel 
strong. Our figures are in stark contrast with the Teger-Pruit,t coefficients, 
which vary between 51 and .78. 
Of course: simple majority is not the only decision scheme that groups 
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AVERAGE OF INDIVIDUAL RISK PREFERENCES 
FIG. 3. Shifts in percentage of risky decisions plotted as a function of initial risk 
preferences. 
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is possible, for instance, that a particular individual member determines 
the group decision completely. We would have here a form of dictatorship, 
and a systematic prediction could be obtained once we knew how to select 
the individual who dictates group decision. A reasonable guess would be 
t,o suppose that the most conservative member determines group decision 
completely. We have computed predictions based on various group- 
decision schemes, and it is evident that nothing of this sort took place in 
the present experiment. These predictions (always based on the totality 
of individual trials), together with the obtained results, are shown in 
Table 2. It is clear from the sums of squared deviations that neither the 
TABTX 2 
GROUP RISK PREFEREKCES IN PERCENTAGES PREDICTED BY 
V.~RIO~-s GROITP-DECISION SCHEMES 
Group 
Decision scheme ZDf a I II III IT’ I- 1-1 VII VIII 
Dictatorship of the 
conservative member 886 25 
moderate member 1448, ST 
risky member 2796.79 
highest winner 1419.23 
Simple majority rule 1796.75 











48.0 45.7 34.6 39.4 51.2 43.9 50.6 
c5.5 T 53 4 57.5 43.9 55.0 46.7 53.3 
58.7 56.1 W.:I 47.8 70.3 51.1 62.2 
X.7 e553.4 34.6 47.8 51.2 51.1 62.2 
56.2 52.6 51.5 40.6 62.2 15.8 .%.O 
15.7 13.7 12.1 8.3 111 8 10.5 16.8 
54.1 .il.i 51.0 43 7 58.X 47.3 55.4 
m.3 61.6 Li’.l 5:i.o .5v.r 44.0 49.4 
u D is the difference between the observed and obtained values. 
majority scheme nor unanimity was used by the groups to arrive at 
decisions. It, is also clear, at the same time, that the average of individual 
risk preferences is an equally poor predictor of group decisions. The 
closest approximation is obtained when we assume that there existed a 
dictatorship of the most conservative member. But the accuracy of this 
prediction still leaves much to be desired. 
With an equal lack of success other decision schemes were tested for 
accuracy of prediction. For instance, the minimal quorum for risk is a 
scheme according to which the group makes a risky decision if at least 
one of its members chooses the risky alternative. This decision scheme 
predicted risky group decisions on 82.2-93.5s of occasions-a figure sub- 
stantially at variance with the obtained results. Also tried were several 
variations of the above schemes in which individual members were dif- 
ferentially weighted. But weighting the largest winner or the most ac- 
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curate group member more than the remaining members did not result 
in significant improvement of the predictions. 
The conclusion that seems to fohow from the above analysis is that 
there occurs a genuine change in individual risk preferences when groups 
are formed. That such a change is indeed a function of being in groups is 
shown by a comparison of the individual risk preferences of the II sub- 
jects and the IG subjects. But it is at the same time apparent that the 
shift in individual choice preferences is not in the direction of greater risk 
but in the direction of greater caution. One can only speculate about the 
causes of such a change in individual risk preferences. One strong possi- 
bility that suggests itself deals with the fact that in the present situation 
each group suffers (or enjoys) the consequences of its decisions. Perhaps, 
when the decision is correct and the group wins, the individual who sug- 
gested the given alternative (or who is given most credit for the decision) 
receives praise for a wise or a lucky choice. On the other hand, the group 
member who is seen as responsible for a losing choice, must feel some 
degree of regret for causing two group members to lose some money. 
Suppose that, when individuals are in groups, the utility of being wrong 
and the utility of being right become parts of the payoffs. But if these 
utilities are added to the monetary values of the risky and conservative 
outcomes (i.e., 1112 cents and 1 cent, respectively), expected values of the 
two alternatives are no longer equal. When the utilities of being right and 
of being wrong become parts of the payoff, the expected value of the 
frequent. alternative is increased and that of the infrequent alternative is 
decreased because the individual is more likely to be correct when he 
chooses the more frequent alternative. If x: is the psychological payoff 
that accrues from being right in the group situation, the expected value of 
the frequent alternative is equal to .6 cents + .6x, and that of the in- 
frequent alternative is equal to .6 cents + .4x. It is natural under these 
circumstances to prefer the frequent alternative. 
The results of the above study have shown that the risky-shift phe- 
nomenon is not as general and universal as previously might have been 
supposed. They suggest that it is a different matter to have information 
about the possible consequences of one’s own (or one’s own group’s) 
decision, and to experience these consequences directly. The data of this 
study are in conflict with those from studies where such information was 
provided (Bern et al., 1965; Wallach et al., 1964). And they are also in 
conflict with the diffusion-of-responsibility hypothesis. The conditions of 
the present experiment were optimal for diffusion of responsibility to take 
place. The decisions were unanimous, there was (very brief) discussion 
prior to each decision, the groups had time to go over their decision 
strategies between trial-blocks, each member was given the opportunity 
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to operate the choice switch equally often, and the payoffs were dis- 
tributed equally among members. Yet, even with these optimal conditions, 
a clear conservative shift was obtained. 
The critical problem that still remains in explaining the risky-shift 
phenomenon is whct’her there are genuine changes in individual risk 
preferences when the individual joins a group. Among past studies the 
clearest indication of a change in individual risk preferences as a function 
of joining a group was obtained in a study by Wallach and Kogan (1965). 
In one condition of their experiment , groups of individuals did engage ill 
a discussion about their individual decisions, but they were not required 
to reach consensus. Following discussion, they were simply asked to 
respond to the choice-dilemmas for the second time. A significant risky 
shift was found for these individuals, as well as for those who engaged 
in a discussion and were required to reach consensus. Moreover, the mag- 
nitude of these shifts did not differ as a function of the requirement for 
consensus. It is possible, however, that the Wallach-Kogan results are 
partly contaminated by experimenter demands. In the critical condition, 
after the discussion, the subjects were told the following: 
All right,. That was a good discussion. Several different p0int.s of view 
were expressed. For some of you, the discussion may have raised issues 
that you had overlooked when filling out the questionnaire individually. 
Now, we would like to find out whet,her the discussion influenced your 
judgment in any way. When making your decision now, don’t feel 
bound by what you did when filling out the questionnaire for the first 
time. We’re not interested in your prior opinion, but rather in just how 
you feel about the situation now. If you still feel the same way, that’s 
quite all right, but we should like you to consider each situation in the 
light of the discussion. As I told you before, we’re interested in seeing 
how much diversity of opinion is generated by each situation. Ob- 
viously, the expression of such diversity should have some impact on 
everyone’s personnl opinions. 3 All right, go ahead znd make your de- 
cisions for the first situation-the one you just discussed (Wallach and 
Kogan, 1965. p. 10). 
The fourth and the penultimate sentences of these instructions com- 
municate rather strong demands. It is true, however, that while they 
contain an expectation of change, they do not specify the direction of this 
change. But perhaps this direction is implied in the descriptions of the 
choice-dilemmas. The subject, is asked to indicate “the minimum odds of 
success [he] would demand before recommending that the more attractive 
or desirable alternative, x, be chosen.” Thus the experimenter also desig- 
’ Italics ours. 
RISK-TAKISG 105 
nates which of two alternatives is the more attractive and desil-able. 
Moreover, the choice-dilemmas are usually so stated t,hat t,he less attrac- 
tive alternative is often unclear as to its probabilities or its payoff. In 
item No. 1, Mr. A’s salary will not “increase much before he retires”; 
in item No. 2, Mr. B’s heart ailment would force him ?,o change many 
of his strongest life habits”; in item No. 5, the weaker alternative con- 
sists of “building another plant in the U.S., where there would be moder- 
ate return on t.he initial investment”; in item No. 6, it consists of entering 
university Y! which ‘(has much less of a reputation in chemistry,” but 
which makes the attainment of a PhD a mere routinc; in item No. 7, the 
conservative alt’ernative is unspecified; in item No. 9, Mr. J. chooses 
between staying in a prisoner-of-war camp or escaping, but the subject 
does not know whether the war will soon end and Mr. J will be liberated, 
etc. 
While it is possible that a change in individual risk preferences has 
occurred in the present experiment, the explanation we suggested above 
implies not a change in risk preferences, but a change in the utilities of 
outcomes. We assumed, namely, that the total payoff for a given outcome 
consists of the monetary gain established by the experimenter a& the 
psychological reward deriving from bein g right. We have further sug- 
gested that the second component of the payoff becomes considerably 
more significant in the group situation. Hence, the change occurred not 
in risk preferences but in the subjective utility of the alternatives. In a 
sense, the theory of diffusion of responsibility also assumes a difference 
in the utilities of outcomes, for it suggests that the negative utility of 
failure is not as great when the failure is shared with others. Future 
research will profitably concentrate upon the problem of determining (a) 
if there is a shift in individual preferences when individuals make de- 
cisions in groups; (b) if such changes are genuine changes in individual 
preferences for risk, or changes in the subjective utilities of outcomes; 
and (c) under what conditions risky-shift phenomena occur without 
changes in individual risk preferences. 
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